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ABSTRACT
While empirical evidence finds only a weak relationship between nominal exchange rates and
macroeconomic fundamentals, forex markets participants often attribute exchange rate movements
to a macroeconomic variable. The variables that matter, however, appear to change over time and
some variable is typically taken as a scapegoat. For example, the current dollar weakness appears
to be caused almost exclusively by the large current account deficit, while its previous strength was
explained mainly by growth differentials. In this paper, we propose an explanation of this
phenomenon in a simple monetary model of the exchange rate with noisy rational expectations,
where investors have heterogeneous information on some structural parameter of the economy. In
this context, there may be rational confusion about the true source of exchange rate fluctuations, so
that if an unobservable variable affects the exchange rate, investors may attribute this movement to
some current macroeconomic fundamental. We show that this effect applies only to variables with
large imbalances. The model thus implies that the impact of macroeconomic variables on the












There is a peculiar mismatch between explanations given by market analysts for ob-
served exchange rate ￿uctuations and the academic consensus about exchange rates.
The academic consensus, based on the seminal work of Richard A. Meese and Ken-
neth Rogo￿ (1983) and subsequent literature, is that macroeconomic variables have
little explanatory power for exchange rates in the short to medium run. On the other
hand, market analysts often point to particular macro developments in accounting for
exchange rates. For example, the large depreciation of the euro relative to the dol-
lar subsequent to its inauguration in January 1999 was blamed on the strong growth
performance of the US economy relative to the European economy. More recently the
appreciation of the euro relative to the dollar has been blamed on the large U.S. cur-
rent account de￿cit.1 That practitioners regularly change the weight they attach to
di￿erent macro indicators is widely reported in the ￿nancial press. It has also been
con￿rmed by Yin-Wong Cheung and Menzie Chinn (2001), who surveyed US foreign
exchange traders.
The varying weight that traders give to di￿erent macro indicators may explain
why formal models of exchange rates have found so little explanatory power of macro
variables. In contrast to existing models, the relationship between macro variables and
1For example, in the Financial Times of December 1, 2003, one can read: "The dollar’s latest
stumble ... came despite optimistic economic data from the US. But analysts said the movement of
the US currency was no longer driven by growth fundamentals. All the focus is on the de￿cit now..."
1the exchange rate appears to be highly unstable. Cheung et. al. (2002) ￿nd that some
models, with certain macro variables, do well in some periods but not in others.
One explanation for this parameter instability is a scapegoat story: some variable
is given an ’excessive’ weight during some period. The exchange rate may change for
reasons that have nothing to do with observed macro fundamentals, for example due
to unobserved liquidity trades. As the market rationally searches for an explanation
for the observed exchange rate change, it may attribute it to some observed macro in-
dicator. This macro indicator then becomes a natural scapegoat and in￿uences trading
strategies. Over time di￿erent observed variables can be taken as scapegoats, so that
the weights attributed to macro variables change.
In this paper we formalize this scapegoat story in the context of a simple rational
expectations model. The model illustrates how a variable can become a scapegoat and
illuminates the implications for the exchange rate. The basic mechanism behind this
scapegoat story is that there is \confusion" in the market about the true source of
exchange rate ￿uctuations. This happens because investors have di￿erent views about
the importance of various observed macro variables. We model this heterogeneity
with investors receiving di￿erent private signals about some structural parameters.
Investors therefore do not know whether an exchange rate ￿uctuation can be explained
by unobserved fundamentals, such as liquidity trades, or by a larger than expected
weight to certain observed macro fundamentals. In such an environment it is natural
to blame the variables you can observe, i.e., the macro fundamentals.
2Although models with investor heterogeneity are common in the ￿nance literature,
they have not often been used to analyze the foreign exchange market. In related
work, Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop (2003), we develop a fully dynamic
macro model of exchange rate determination where investors have di￿erent information
about future macro variables. We show that such a framework can lead to a disconnect
between observed macro fundamentals and exchange rates in the short to medium
run, but a closer relationship in the long-run. In that paper it is assumed that all
investors know the model and its parameters. In contrast, here we assume that investors
are incompletely, and heterogeneously, informed about some parameters and therefore
about the importance of various macro indicators.
In the next section we present a simple monetary model of the exchange rate,
where investors have di￿erent views about the growth rate of fundamental variables.
In Section 2, we show how the model is solved and how a scapegoat can emerge.
A crucial element is that investors use the exchange rate as a source of information
on imperfectly known parameters. In Section 3, we examine the implications for the
exchange rate and provide concluding comments in Section 4.
2 A Model with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Our starting point is the standard monetary model of exchange rate determination. It
contains three equations. The ￿rst is a purchasing power parity equation: pt = p￿
t +st,
where st is the log of the nominal exchange rate. The second is a money demand
3equation: mt ￿pt = yt ￿￿it (and foreign analogue). The third is an interest arbitrage
equation:





Here Et denotes the average expectation of individual investors and ￿2
t is the conditional
variance of next period’s exchange rate. bt is the unobserved net supply of foreign
currency based on non-speculative trade (such as liquidity trades) and has a normal
distribution N(0;￿2
b). This interest parity equation can be derived from a standard
portfolio choice model with constant absolute risk-aversion ￿. We refer the reader to
Olivier Jeanne and Andrew K. Rose (2002) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003)
for formal derivations.
As usual, (1) is solved forward after substituting the purchasing power parity and
money demand equations, leading to an expression equating the current exchange rate
to the present value of expected future fundamentals. In our context, however, we are
dealing with average instead of single expectations. In Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003) we show that this implies that the law of iterated expectations may not hold and
that the exchange rate may depend on higher order expectations as in John Maynard
Keynes’ beauty contest paradigm (average expectations of average expectations, and
so on). While the presence of higher order expectations has interesting implications
for asset price behavior in general (see Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris, and Hyun Song
Shin (2003), and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004)), we abstract from them in this
short paper by assuming that information heterogeneity lasts only one period.
4We assume that starting at date 2 investors have common information about future
output levels and money supplies. To keep things simple we assume that E2(mt) =
E2(yt) = 0 for t > 2 and that the foreign money supply and output level are zero at all
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The exchange rate depends on current and expected future macro fundamentals minus
a risk-premium term that depends on liquidity trade. Investors need to forecast money
and output at time 2. We assume the following autoregressive structure (applying only
at time 2):
m2 ￿ m = ￿m(m1 ￿ m) + "
m
2 (3)
y2 ￿ y = ￿y(y1 ￿ y) + "
y
2
with 0 < ￿j < 0 and "
j
2 ￿ N(0;￿2
j), j = m;y. The persistence coe￿cients ￿m and ￿y
are a key element of the model. The larger ￿m, the bigger the impact of the current
money supply on the exchange rate, and similarly for output. However, investors do
not know the persistence coe￿cients and only receive private signals about them:
v
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We assume that errors in the private signals average to zero across all investors. We
5can plug the expectation derived from (3) into (2) to get:






where ~ ￿ ￿ ￿
(1+￿)2 and q1 ￿ 1
1+￿(m1 ￿ y1) + ~ ￿(m ￿ y). Equation (4) shows that the
exchange rate depends in a straightforward manner on the observable variables m1 and
y1 as well as the unobservable b1. Moreover, it depends on the average expectations
of the persistence coe￿cients, E1(￿m) and E1(￿y). With heterogeneous information,
individual investors do not know these average expectations and cannot disentangle
shocks to b1 from shocks to E1(￿m) and E1(￿y). This di￿culty in the inference process
can lead to rational confusion, which in turn can lead to attributing the wrong weight
to fundamental variables.
3 Finding a Scapegoat
The equilibrium exchange rate can be solved with a simple signal extraction procedure.
Based on (4), we ￿rst conjecture that the exchange rate takes the form
s1 = q1 + ~ ￿￿m(m1 ￿ m) ￿ ~ ￿￿y(y1 ￿ y) ￿ ￿b1 (5)
for some positive ￿. The exchange rate depends linearly on the unknown persistence
coe￿cients ￿m and ￿y, and therefore provides a public signal of these parameters. It
is therefore optimal for individual investors to use both their private signals and the
exchange rate as basis for estimating ￿m and ￿y. We now describe the inference process
and the solution for the exchange rate in the case where y1 = y, so that investors are
6only interested in estimating ￿m. The more general case can be found in a Technical
Appendix available upon request.
From (5), investors can use an adjusted exchange rate signal that is normally dis-
tributed:
s1￿q1
~ ￿(m1￿m). Since the private signal is also normal, the optimal inference of ￿m
is a linear combination of the two signals. Aggregating the expectations of ￿m over
individuals, we get:2
E(￿m) = ￿v￿m + (1 ￿ ￿v)
s1 ￿ q1
~ ￿(m1 ￿ m)
(6)
where 0 < ￿v < 1 depends on the (endogenous) relative precision of private and





b)). A crucial element in the analysis is that
the expectation of ￿m depends on the value of the exchange rate. Using (5), one can
substitute s1 to obtain:
E(￿m) = ￿m ￿ k(m1 ￿ m)b1 (7)
where k =
(1￿￿v)￿
~ ￿(m1￿m)2 > 0. It is easily veri￿ed that the conjectured equation (5) is
con￿rmed if one substitutes (7) into (4), with ￿ = ￿
1+￿￿￿2
1=￿v.
Equation (7) illustrates how an observed macro variable can become a scapegoat.
Investors know that the equilibrium exchange rate takes the form (5). While they
know the functional form, they do not know the persistence ￿m and liquidity trades
b1. When an investor sees that the exchange rate is higher than expected based on the
private signal of persistence, there can be only two explanations: either unobserved
liquidity sales have reduced b1 or the persistence coe￿cient di￿ers from the private
2Here we use the fact that summing over the signals vi
m gives ￿m.
7signal. In the case where money supply is large, so that m1 ￿ ￿ m is large, a high
exchange rate can then be explained by a large persistence coe￿cient. The reason is
that more persistence leads to a bigger expected second period money supply when
the money supply is above its mean in period 1.
Now assume that the high level of the exchange rate is actually caused by liquidity
trades. It then becomes rational to make money the scapegoat when the money supply
is unusually large. Even if investors do not believe that the high money supply will be
so persistent based on their private information, they will each believe that others have
private signals indicating that money supply is persistent. The scapegoat is captured
by (7), which shows that the expected persistence rises when b1 < 0 and m1 ￿ ￿ m > 0.
The rational confusion that leads to making money the scapegoat is market-wide.
Based on private information alone the average expectation of ￿m is equal to ￿m.
However, when b1 < 0 and m1￿m > 0 investors systematically, and incorrectly, believe
that ￿m is larger than it actually is. They all believe that others must have information
indicating that ￿m is very large, even if no investor actually has such information.
Output can similarly become a scapegoat. The Technical Appendix shows that
if y1 6= y we have ￿ E(￿y) = ￿y + e k(y1 ￿ ￿ y)b1. If the exchange rate is high due to
liquidity trades and output is below its mean (y1 ￿ ￿ y < 0), investors revise upward
their expectation of ￿y and output becomes a scapegoat. The larger the deviations
from the mean, the more likely it is to blame one of the macro variables.
84 The Scapegoat E￿ect on Exchange Rates
When a macro variable becomes a scapegoat, it has a much larger impact on the
exchange rate than otherwise due to confusion with liquidity trade. In this regard an
important role is played by the parameter ￿ = ￿
1+￿￿￿2
1=￿v that multiplies liquidity trade
in the equilibrium exchange rate. This coe￿cient is larger than in the risk-premium
term in (2) or (4) because ￿v < 1. This implies that the impact of b1 is ampli￿ed with
heterogeneous information.3 More important in our context, it is easy to check that ￿
depends positively on (m1￿ ￿ m)2. In other words, @￿=@(m1￿m)2 > 0. If the deviation
of money from its mean is large, there is more rational confusion that leads to a bigger
ampli￿cation of the impact of liquidity trade on the exchange rate.







+ ~ ￿￿m ￿ ￿(m1 ￿ m)b1 (8)
where ￿ = 2@￿=@(m1 ￿ m)2 > 0. The impact of m1 therefore depends on b1. For
example, if m1 > m a negative b1 increases the impact of m1.
With no liquidity shocks the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to money
would be only 1
1+￿ + ~ ￿￿m, the same as it would be under perfect foresight. A similar
impact obtains if money supply is close to its normal level m. It is the interplay
between the unobserved liquidity trades and the unusual size of the money supply that
3This ampli￿cation of shocks is similar to the one discussed in detail in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003).
9delivers the scapegoat e￿ect and its increased weight in the equilibrium exchange rate.
The derivative in (8) is not known to market participants since ￿m is unknown.
One can compute the average expectation of (8), by using (5) to (7) (see the Technical







+ ~ ￿￿m ￿ (￿￿v + ~ ￿k)(m1 ￿ m)b1 (9)
Clearly, the same reasoning applies to the perceived impact of m1 on s1 as to the actual
impact. The reason is that ￿m is expected to be larger than it actually is when m1 is
large and b1 is negative.
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, it is worth noting that when the
impact of money on the exchange rate is large as a result of the scapegoat e￿ect, the
impact of liquidity trade is also magni￿ed. The rational confusion raises the impact of
both money shocks and liquidity trades. Second, we have focused on the case where
macro variables have increased weight. The opposite can also occur, for example,
when the exchange rate is high due to a negative b1 and the money supply is below
normal. On average, macro variables have the correct weight because on average b1 = 0.
However, this average weight may be small, so that observed macro variables do not
consistently contribute much to observed exchange rate volatility.
5 Conclusion
In this short paper we have developed a simple model to illuminate some implications
of information dispersion for the importance of macro variables in the equilibrium
10exchange rate. We have shown that when unobserved speculative trades are responsible
for an exchange rate depreciation, an unusually high money supply can easily be made
the scapegoat. We introduced only two macro fundamentals, money supply and output,
but in reality one can have a large number of such macro indicators. When a macro
fundamental becomes a scapegoat, its impact on the exchange rate can be much larger
than otherwise.
While the model we adopted here is close to static in nature in order to keep
things simple, future work should naturally focus on a more dynamic model with
information heterogeneity of the sort described here. This can account for phenomena
such as parameter instability and changing weight given by investors to di￿erent macro
indicators.
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136 Technical Appendix
6.1 Solving the model with inference on two parameters
In this Appendix we solve the case where m1 6= m and y1 6= y so that investors
make inference about both ￿m and ￿y. The reasoning with two variables can easily be
extended to a model with N variables and N signals. We start from equation (4) and
conjecture equation (5). Then s1 ￿ q1 is normally distributed with variance ￿2￿2
b and
gives information on both ￿m and ￿y. This is combined with private signals vi
m and vi
y.
Let the vectors of signals be Y 0 = (s1 ￿ q1;vi
m;vi
y) and de￿ne ￿











































































Y = X￿ + "
i (11)
























Since the signals are normal, the best estimate of ￿ is a linear regression:
E
i










14The average expectation is then:

































































































Z ￿ (m1 ￿ m)



















































1 + e ￿kZ (15)










15The next step is to compute ￿2
1. First, we assume that the conditional variance of










Thus, using (3) :
￿
2
1 = var(s2) =
1
(1 + ￿)








This can be written as:
￿
2








where A is a constant, n0 =
h
1
1+￿(m1 ￿ m);￿ 1
1+￿(y1 ￿ y)
i
and we use the fact that
var(￿) = (X0￿￿1X)
￿1. From (17), we get:
￿
2




















































4This is justi￿ed by assuming that we are at a steady state, except for periods 1 and 2. Since
the model implies that st = 1
1+￿(mt ￿ yt) ￿ ￿
1+￿￿￿2
tbt, we have ￿2
t = 1







t+1. We assume that var(mt ￿ yt) is constant. This is a di￿erence equation in ￿2
t that
in general leads to two steady-state values. It can be shown, however, that only the smallest value is
stable. We assume that ￿2 is equal to that value.





















@Z > 0, @￿
@Z > 0.
6.2 Deriving Equations (8) and (9)
Here we specialize to one parameter, ￿m, so that Z = (m1 ￿ m)2. Notice also that in














We then get (8) by noting that @￿
@m1 = 2 @￿
@Z(m1 ￿ m) = ￿(m1 ￿ m).











Taking expectations of (5) and using (6), we ￿nd Eb1 = ￿vb1. We substitute this and
E￿m from (7) to ￿nd (9).
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